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THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, IV.* 
·. (4) The Hn!Jenclmn Clause. 
This clause follows the grant, and is one of the most distinctive 
features of the modern oil and gas lease. Occasionally the dura-
tion of the lease is fixed by the granting clause; some times. by a 
miscellaneous provision appearing therein. But generally speaking, 
the habendum defines the term of the present-day oil and gas lease. 
At any rate a discussion of the legal effect of the habendum clause 
whicl1 now characterizes these instruments will involve the treat-
ment of every important question which arises under this heading. 
At the outset we should observe that the clause is the direct result 
of a natural evolution in the methods and customs of the busi-
ness. Also that the provision owes its present form to two com-
pelling considerations. The first deals with the situation of the 
lessor and the second with the situation of the lessee. Manifestly 
a landowner is reluctant to encumber his land for an in<lefinite time 
with an unproductive lease. This statement does not imply that 
every lease, or even a substantial proportion of the leases taken, 
must be developed. The industry could not survive if such were 
the requirement. "What is meant is that the lessee shall have a rea-
sonable period ·for exploration, and if within this interval no wells 
are drilled or if the wells drilled prove to be nonproductive, then 
the lease expires, leaving the lessor free to make such disposition 
of his land as he will. Therefore in formulating a provision fixing 
the duration of an oil and gas lease the obvious self-interest of the 
lessor must be taken into account. On the other hand, the sole 
risk of the venture rests with the lessee. He must enter upon a 
precarious and uncertain undertaking attended by great finandal 
hazard. In such circumstances the duration of the lease must be 
sufficiently inviting to induce him to devote his energies and capital 
to a business wholly speculative in character. Clearly the answer 
to the predicament of the lessee is this: If he find production with-
in the exploratory period then he should have the enjoyment of his 
lease during its profitable life. Founded upon these basic consid-
erations the .industry finally has evolved the following habendum 
*Continue~ from 18 MTC"H. L. Ri.v. 773. 
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clause: "To have and to hold said premises for the purposes 
aforesaid to and unto the lessee, its successors and assigns, for the 
term of five years from date hereof and as much longer tliereaff..:r 
as oil or gas shall be produced therefrom in pa'j'ing quantities." 
It is to be ~oticed that this clause performs a double function. First 
of all it provides that the lease shall expire at the end of a limited 
_ term of reasonable duration unless the lessee ·at that time is pro-
ducing oil or gas in paying quantities. Thus far the provision. is 
for the exclusive benefit of the lessor. Supplementing this, how· 
ever, is a provision whereby the lessee is vested with the right to hold 
the lease as long as oil or gas is fotmd in paying quantities upon 
the condition that the lease is made productive during the fixed term. 
Therefore the clause serves the peculiar interest of the lessee also. 
In order to grasp the exact significance of the clause in the 
economy of our subject we must review the conditions which 
brought it to its present form. 
Broadly speaking, the duration of the oil and gas lease is dis-
tinguished by three stages of development. The first period ex-
tended from the beginning of the industry until about 188o, and 
was characterized chiefly by a lease providing for a fixed and defin-
ite term, just as was true of all ordinary mining- leases of that 
day. The interval between 1880 and 1900 marked the tram;itiori 
from the early type to the modern lease. Since 1900 it .has been 
the almost universal custom to employ a lease providing for a 
fixed term of limited duration, with a proviso carrying the lease 
beyond that term upon the condition that oil or gas is being pro-
duced in paying quantities at the end of the stated term. Turning 
to the initial period, it was to be expected that during the first two 
or three years of its history the inc;lustry shouk! be found groping 
for an appropriate and adaptable provision to establish the duration 
of its basic contract. At this time there was no pronounced drift 
toward uniformity in the tert)1 of the lease, a]though many leases 
appeared of record during the interval which were to "continue in 
force until annulled by mutual agreement." Such was the form 
employed in a lease considered in one of the early Pennsylvania 
cases.1 Then again it was provided: "Should oil and salt or 
either he found in profitable quantities, lease to be perpetual for all 
1 Union Petroleum Co. v. Bliven Petroleum Co., 72 Pa. St. 173 (1872). 
THE LAW OF OIL.AND GAS 
purposes therein mentioned."2 Again: "If oil is found, the right 
to pump to continue as long as rent (royalty) is paid."3 Setting 
aside these very early grants, the leases of the era fell into three 
general classes : First, leases made perpetual by express provision 
which were subject to forfeiture within the term if operations were 
not commenced within a stipulated time. Second, leases which were 
silent as to term, these also providing for the commencement of 
operations within a specified period, or the forfeiture of the grant. 
In a lease of this class there was no e.."{press provision for the con-
tinuance of the grant during the period of production. Although 
the point has never been squarely decided, it is probable that this 
right would be implied. Such is the intimation in one jurisdiction 
at least.• Leases of the two classes just described were exceptional, 
however, and the period was definitely characterized by a lease for 
a fixed term, usually ranging from fifteen to twenty-five years, al-
though leases for forty, fifty, and even ninety-nine years were by 
no means uncommon.r. 
"Rynd v. Rynd Farm Oil Co., 63 Pa. St 397 (1869). 
"Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. 164 (1867). 
•Tucker v. Watts, 2s Ohio Cir. Ct Rep. (NS) 320 (1903). 
• Chicago & Allegheny Co. v. United States Petroleum Co., 57 Pa. St 
83 (1868), 20 years Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. St. 297 (1870), so years; Allison's 
Appeal, 77 Pa. St 221, (1874), 20 years; Brown v. Vandergrift, 8o Pa. 142 
(187s), 20 years; Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. St. Ig8 (I878), 2I years; 
Munroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. St. 307 (1-88o), 20 years; Kitchen v. Smith, 
IOI Pa. St 4s2 (I882), IS years; Duke v. Hague, I07 Pa. St. 57 (I884), 20 
;rears; Brown v. Beecher, 120 Pa. St. 590, IS Atl. 6o8 (I888), IS years; 
Washington Gas Co. v. Johnson, I23 Pa. St. s76, I6 Atl. 799 (I889), 20 years; 
Appeal of Wills, I30 Pa. 222, l~ Atl. 721 (1889), 20 years; Thompson v. 
Ridelsperger, I44 Pa. 416, 22 At!. 826 (1891), IS years; Duffield v. Rosenz-
weig, I44 Pa. s20, 23 Atl. 4 (1891), IS years; McKnight v. Gas Co., 146 Pa. 
I8S, 23 Atl. 164 (1892), 20 years; Nesbit v. Godfrey, lS5 Pa. 251, 2s Atl. 621 
( I893), 21 years; Sanders v. Sharp, I53 Pa. 5SS, 2s Atl. 524· ( 1893), 20 years; 
Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, lS2 Pa. St 4s1, 2s Atl. 732 (1893), 20 years; Mc-
Nish v. Stone, 152 Pa. 4S7, 2s Atl. 732 (1879), 99 years; Williams v. Guffy, 
178 Pa. 342; 3S Atl. 87s (I8g6), 20 years; Mathews v. People's Gas Co., I79 
Pa. I6S, 36 Atl. 216 (1897), 20 years; Gale v. Oil Run Pet Co., 6 W. Va. 
200 (1873), 20 years; Wood Co. Pet. Co. v. Transportation Co., 28 W. Va. 
210, (1886), IS years; Guffy v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 49, II S. E. 754. (18go), 20 
years; Thomas v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 38s, 12 S. E. s22 (I8go), 20 years; Hukill 
v. Myers, 36 W. Va. 639, IS S. E. lSI (I892), 20 years; Hukill v. Guffy, 37 
W. Va. 42S, I6 S. E. S44 (I892), 20 years; Haskell v. Sutton, S3 W. Va. 2o6, 
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When we consider this type of lease in the light of our present 
kn°'•:ledge of the subject it is at once evident that a lease termi-
nating on a definite day in the future is not adapted to the peculiar 
nature of the business. We 1.-now now that a lease will continue 
to produce oil at a profit for a much longer period than the fifteen, 
twenty or twenty-five year term provided here. Today wells are 
still in operation in Pennsylvania which have been producing for fifty 
years. Wells in that district which have produced for forty years 
are the rule rather than the exception. In Ohio and West Virginia 
there are properties which have been producing for thirty or 
thirty-five years. Even in the more recent oil-producing states 
there are wells which are from fifteen to twenty years old and 
which are now being operated at a substantial profit. But mani-
festly these things were unknown to the early operators. Tc them 
the whole enterprise was a precarious experiment at best. It was 
problematical whether the fields then in operation would ever pro-
duce enough petroleum to put the business upon a permanent ba-
sis. Furthermore, the vision of these men did not extend beyond 
the few districts which were then productive. Even the question 
of an enduring market was shrouded in uncertainty. These condi-
tions in themselves implied a s~ort-term lease. Moreover, it was 
universally believed that an oil property would exh:.).ust rapidly, and 
in the light of the experi~nce then possessed by persons engaged 
in the business this conclusion had some foundation. The area of 
a lease was decidedly restricted, which fact under ordinary circum-
stances would enable the lessee to recover the oil content of his 
property within a much shorter period than was true of the more 
extensive leases which charaderized the industry later. Again, the 
daily production of the wells was small in comparison with later 
discoveries, which indicated the probable exhausti'on of a property 
within a comparatively brief period. Above everything the capa-
city of petroleum to migrate underground was greatly exaggerated 
in the popular mind. It was believed that one well would drain 
the oil from a large area speedily and completely. These consider-· 
-44 S. E. 533 (1903), 20 years; Van Etten v. Kelly, 66 Ohio St. 6o5, 64 N. E. 
56o (1902), ·15 years; Baumgardner v. Browning, J2 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 73 
(1896), 20 years; Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N. Y. 501, 62 N. E. 584 (1902), 
40 years •. 
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ations induced the early operators to commit the industry to a 
lease of limited duration. 
When these leases began to expire, however, it became increas-
ingly evident, that a lease of this type was not adapted to the enter-
prise. The average lessee would find himself in this predicament. 
Two or three years before the termination of his lease the property 
would be pr~ducing oil in substantial quantities and would give 
every promise of producing for an in~efinite period in the future,-· 
at any rate for a considerable length of time beyond the fixed term 
of the lease. There would be no provision for renewal, and ac-
cordingly the lessee would ·be faced by the unhappy alternative of 
surrendering a valuable property or of negotiating a renewal. 
Usually if this concession were obtainable under any circumstances 
it would J;ie at a price equivalent to the full value of the lease-hold 
at the time. In other words, the lessee was put to· the necessity of 
purchasing a property which had been developed at his sole risk 
and expense. Manifestly this situation alone was sufficient to con-
vince the industry that a lease effective throughout the period of 
production was an indispensable requisite. But experience had 
revealed other compelling objections to a lease of this character. 
It had been demonstrated that the practical method of operating 
an oil property was -this. First, the lessee should continue to drill 
wells as long as paying wells were found until the property was 
completely developed. As a result, both parties realized the great-
est possible profit from the venture. Secondly, when paying wells 
were found on adjoining lands the lessee should offset the same 
promptly in order to protect the leased premises from drainage. 
But a lease of fixed duration was not adapted to this plan of devel-
opment. Here a stage would be reached toward the end of the 
grant when the lessee could not afford to drill additional 'Wells 
even to protect the land from drainage because the production there-
from within the remaining term of the lease would not be suffi-
cient to pay the cost of drilling. The result was inevitable. Dur-
ing the last two or three years of the lease the lessee would refrain 
from all drilling operations, contenting himself with the production 
from the wells drilled previously. On the other hand a lease ef-
fective as long as oil or gas should be found justified an uninter-
rupted course of development, .dependent only upon the result 
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achieved. A further circumstance which was calculated to Induce 
the lessors of that period to renounce the lease of fixed duration 
was this. As a rule,· the removal of the casing from an oil well 
necessitates the abandonment of the well. Most of these early 
leases by express stipulation gave the lessee the right to remove 
the casing from all wells at the termination of the lease. Ev~n in 
the absence of a provision of this character it was the rule in Penn-
sylvania that the casing in a well was a trade fixture which the 
lessee had the right to withdraw upon the termination of the lease.6 
Occasionally where the parties were unable to agree upon a re-
newal the lessee would permit the lessor to purchase the casing at 
cost, but in frequent instances a lessee would draw the casing from 
his wells at the expiration of his lease, yielding the lessor a: dis-
mantled, or perhaps valueless, property. These and numerous other 
practical considerations unnecessary to mention here, brought both 
lessors and lessees to the realization that the instrument which was 
peculiarly adapted to the prosecution of the business was a lease to 
continue in force as long as oil or gas should be found in paying 
quantities. 
This brings us to the second stage in the development of the 
term of the oil and gas lease, namely, the transition period. In the 
late seventies leases for a definite term of years and as long there-
after as oil or gas should ·be produced in paying quantities began 
to appear of record in the oil districts of Pennsylvania, West Vir-
ginia and Ohio, but the first lease of this character considered in a 
reported case was maoe in I~8I.7 Here the habendum clause pro-
vided: "To have and to hold the same for the term of twelve 
years from this date, or flS lon;g as oil is found in paying quantities." 
Between I88o ·and I89<> this type of lease was in somewhat general 
use in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio and Indiana,8 although 
•Shetlar v. Shivers, 171 Pa. St. 569, 33 Atl. 95 (1895); Cassell v. Cro-
thers, 193 Pa. St. 359, 44 Atl. 446 (1899) ; Sattler v. Opperman, 47 Pittsburgh 
Legal Journal, 205 (1899); Sattler v. Opperman, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 32 
(1900); Forest Oil Co. v. Hart, 50 Pittsburgh Legal Journal, 17 (1902); 
Smith v. Hickman, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 46 ( 1900). . 
'Eaton v. Alleghany Gas Co., 122 N. Y. 416, 25 N. E. g81 (18go). 
a Agerter v. Vandergrift, 138 Pa. 576, 21 Atl. 202 (1891); Smiley v. 
Western Pa. Nat. ·Gas Co., 138 Pa. St. 576, 21 Atl. I (18g1); Springer v. 
Citizens Nat. Gas Co., 145 Pa. Ct. 430, 22 Atl. 986 (18g1); Heintz v. Shortt, 
149 Pa. St 286 24 Atl. 316 (1892); Glasgow v. Chartiers Oil Co., 152 Pa. 
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leases of fixed duration were by no means uncommon during this 
interval.11 In the succeeding decade, however, it became the almost 
St. 48, 2s Atl. 232 (1892); Gibson v. Oliver, 158 Pa. St. 277, 27 Atl. g61 
(18g3) ; Western Pa. Gas Co. v. George, 16! Pa. St. 47, 28 Atl. 1004 (1894) ; 
Hooks v. Forst,--I6S Pa. St. 238, 30 Atl. 846 (1895); Shellar v. Shivers, 171 
Pa. St. s6g, 33 Atl. 95 ( 1895) ; Double v. Union Heat & Light Co., 172 Pa. 
St. 388, 33 Atl. 694 ( 1896) ; Stage v. Boyer, 183 Pa. St. soo, 38· Atl. 1035 
(1898); Akin v. Marshall Oil Co., 188 Pa. St. 602, 41 Atl. 748 (1898); Burton 
v. Forest Oil Co., 204, Pa. St. 349, 54 Atl. 266 (1903) ; Schaupp v. Hukill, 34 
W. Va. 37S, 12 S. E. sor (1890); Crawford v. Ritchie, 43 W. Va. 252, 27 S. 
E. 220 (1897); Crawford v. Belleview Nat. Gas Co., 183 Pa. St. 227, 38 Atl. 
S95 (18g7); Jackson v. O'Hara, 183 Pa. St. 233, 38 Atl. 624 (1897); Core 
v. New York Pet. Co., 52 W. Va. 76, 43 S. E. 128 (1902); Toothman v. 
Courtney, 62 W. Va. 167, 58 S. E. 915 (1907); Herrington v. Wood, 6 Ohio 
Cir. Ct. Rep. 326 (1892); Baker v. Stow, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N. S.) 489 
(18g2); Miller v. Vandergrift, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N. S.) 47S (1892); 
Northwestern Ohio Nat. Gas. Co. v. Whitacre, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N. S.) 
sos (1892); Hollister v. Vandergrift, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N. S.) s86 
(1892); Emerine v. Steel, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 381 (1894); Northwestern 
Ohio Nat. Gas Co. v. Davis, 9 Ohio Cir. Ct Rep. SSl (18gs); Stahl v. Van 
Vleck, S3 Ohio St. 136, 41 N. E. 3S (18Qs); Simon v. Northwestern Ohio 
Nat. Gas Co., 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 170 (1896); Blair v. Northwestern Nat. 
Gas. Co., 12.0hio Cir. Ct. Rep. 78 (18g6); Woodland Oil Co. v. Crawford, 
SS Ohio St. 161, 44 N. E. 1093 (18g6); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., S7 Ohio St. 
u8, 48 N. E. s02 (1897); Northwestern Ohio Nat. Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 
Ohio St. 2S9, 67 N. E. 494 (1903); Ev.ans v. Consumers' Gas Trust Co., -
Ind. Sup. --, 29 N. E. 398 (18g1); Indianapolis Nat.· Gas Co. v. Kibbey~ 
l3S Ind. 3S7, 3!' N. E. 392 (18g3); Edmonds v. Mounsey, lS Ind. App. 399, 
44 N. E. 1g6 (18g6); Indianapolis Gas Co. v. Teters, IS Ind. App. 47S, 44 
N. E. 549 (18g6); American1 Window Glass Co. v. Williams, 30 Ind. App. 
68s, 66 N. E. 912 (1903); Indiana Nat. Gas & Oil Co. v. Grainger, 33 Ind. 
App. S59, 70 N. E. 395 (1904). 
•wmiams v. Guffy, 178 Pa. St. 342, 35 Atl. 875 (1896); Mathews v. 
People's Gas Co., 179 Pa. St. 165, 36 Atl. 216 (18g7); Washington Nat. Gas 
Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. St. 576, 16 Atl. 799 (188g); Appeal of Wills, 130 
Pa. St. 222, 18 Atl. 721 (188g); Brown v. Beecher, 120 Pa. St. 590, 15 Atl. 
6o8 (1888); Thompson v. Ridelsperger, 144 Pa. 416, 22 Atl. 826-827 (18g1); 
Duffield v. Rosenzweig, 144 Pa. 520, 23 Atl. 4 (18g1)-; Nesbitt v. Godfrey, 
155 Pa. 251, 25 Atl. 621 (18g3); Sanders v. Sharp, 153 Pa. 555, 25 Atl. 524 
(18g3); Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa. 451, 25 Atl. 732 (18g3); Guffy 
v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 49, II S. E 754 (1890); Thomas v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 
385, 12 S. E. 522 (18go); Hukill v. Myers, 36 W. Va. 639, 15 S. E. 151 (1892); 
Hukill v. Guffy, 37 W. Va. 425, 16 S. E. 544 (18g2); Haskell v. Sutton, 53 
W. Va. 206, 44 S. E. 533 (1903); Van Etten v. Kelly, 66 Ohio St. 6o5, 64 
N. E. 56o (1902); Bau~gardner v. Browning, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 73 (18g6). 
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. 
universal practice to take leases effective for the producing life of 
the property. Although the oil industry had thus achieved its own 
objective it was still reluctant to consent to the type of lease which 
the peculiar situation of the lessor required, namely, a lease expiring 
at the end of a fixed term of reasonable duration unless made pro-
ductive within that period. Three types of leases now came into 
use which were designed to enable the lessee· to hold the lessor's 
land for a long term or for an indefinite period without develop-
ment. The first leases of this description were for terms ranging 
from fifteen to twenty-five years and as long thereafter as oil or 
gas should be found. 1<> As a rule a lease 9f this description would 
contain a provision vesting the lessee with the right to hold the 
grant for the entire fixed term of fifteen or twenty-five years, as 
the case might be, without development and upon. the payment of a 
periodical rental only. If production were found during the ex-
ploratory period, however, the lease would remain in force as long 
as that condition continued. In other words, the only change oc-
curring here was that the phrase "as long thereafter as oil or gas 
shall be found in paying quantities" was added to the limited haben-
dum clause of the fifteen or twenty-five year leases which were 
then passing into disuse. This innovation accomplished nothing in 
the direction of reducing the length of the exploratpry period. On 
the other hand leases of this description did :qot meet the design 
of the industry completely, because in many cases lessees were bound 
to the payment of a rental for a long term regardless of the prob-
able value of the property for the purposes of the lease. The situ-
ation resulted in an experiment by means of which the industry 
sought to achieve a twofold object: .First, a lease effective for the 
purpose of exploration as long as the lessee might elect to pay the 
,. Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. 564 (1896); Calhoun v. Neely, 
201 Pa. 97, 50 Atl. 967 (1902); Wilson v. Philadelphia Co., 210 Pa. 484, 6o 
Atl. 149 (1904); Mcintosh v. Ropp, 233 Pa. 497, 82 Atl. 949 (1912); Hukill 
v. Guffy, 37 W. Va. 425, 16 S. E. 544 (18g2); Crawford v. Ritchey, 43 W. Va. 
252, 27 S. E. 220 (1897); Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co .. 51 
W. Va. 583, 42 S. E. 655 (1902); South Penn Oil Co. v. Haught, 71 W. Va. 
720, 78 S. E. 759 (1913); Freeman v. McKay, - W. Va.-, 98 S. E. 263 
(1919); Siler v. Globe Window Glass Co., 21 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 284 (1900); 
Munsey v. Marnett Oil & Gas Co. (Tc..'C. Civ. App.), - Tex. -, 199 S. W. 
686 (r917). 
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stipulated rental,. the lessee having the right to retire from the con-
tract when the value of the property no longer justified such pay-
ment; secondly, in the event production were realized it was in-
tended that the lease should remain in force as long as oil or gas 
· was produced in paying quantities. The consequence of a lease of 
this character is immedi:itely appare.nt. It enabled the lessee to 
hold the lessor's lands indefinitely without development. In these 
circumstances two types of leases Caine into use. In the one case 
the habendum clause took this form: "To have and to hold the 
above premises unto the parties of the second part, their heirs and 
assigns, on the following conditions."11 No term was stated but 
the rental clause was so phrased as to permit the lessee to hold the 
lease indefinitely by the payment of the periodical rental. It was 
also provided that if production were developed during the indefin-
ite term, that is, while the lessee was holding the grant by the pay-
ment of rental, the instrument should remain in force as long as oil 
or gas was produced in paying quantities. This form came into 
rather general use in West Virginia, Ohio and Indiana.n In the 
other type the habendum clause was in this language: "'To haYe1 
and t0 hold said premises for the term of ten years, or thereafter 
while oil or gas is produced in paying quantities or the rental 
paid.'~1• It is to be noticed that the happening of either one of two 
conditions would carry the lease beyond the fixed term: First, the 
finding of production within that period, ·or, secondly, the payment 
of the stipulated rental. In other words, the legal effect of this 
lease was identical with the one involved in Lowther Oil Co. v. 
Guffey. The form was very generally employed in Pennsylvania, 
West Virginia and Indiana.1' Neither of these leases withstood 
11 Lowther Oil Co. v. Guffy, 52 W. Va. 88, 43 S. E. 101 (1902). 
uweaver v. Akin. 48 W. Va. 456, 37 S. E. 6oo (I!)OC>); Johnson v. Arm-
strong, 81 W. Va. 399, 94 S. E. 753 (1917); Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 W. Va. 220, 
83 S. E. g83 (1914); Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 329, 88 S. E. 
1075 (1916); Central Ohio Gas Co. v. Eckert, 70 Ohio St. 127, 71 N. E. 281 
(1904); Carr v. Huntington Light Co., 33 Ind. App. I, 70 N. E. 552 (1904); 
Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. Leer, 34 Ind. App. 61, 72 N. E. 283 (1904); Diehl 
v. Ohio Oil Co., 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N.S.) 539 (1892), 20 0. C. D. 750 . 
.....t' Burton v. Forest Oil Co., 204 Pa. St. 349, 54 Atl. 266 ( 1903). 
"Letherman v. Oliver, 151 Pa. St. 646, 25 ,Atl. 309 (1892) ; Western Pa. 
Gas Co. v. George. 16x Pa. St. 47, 28 Atl.- 1004 (1894); Summerville v: 
:\poll-. Gas Co., 207 Pa. 334, 56 Atl. 876 (1904); Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas 
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the scrutiny of the courts. The rule was everywhere adopted that 
when a lessee had the apparent right to hold a lease indefinitely 
upon the payment of a, rental alone the lessor might demand a well, 
give the lessee a reasonable time to perform, and failure to drill was 
ground for the cancellation of the lease.15 This judicial announce-
ment brought the industry to the adoption of the habendum clause 
which now characterizes the oil and gas lease. Otherwise stated, 
when the courts decided that a lessee could not hold his lease in-
definitely by the mere payment of a rental, the only alternative was 
Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909); Burgan v. South Penn Oil Co., 24J Pa. 
128, 89 Atl. 823 (1914); McKean Nat. Gas Co. v. Wolcott, 254 Pa. 323, g8 
Atl. 955 (1916); Schaupp v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 375, 12 S. E. 501 (18go); 
Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (18g6); Myers v. Garnahan, 
61 W. Va. 414, 57 S. E. 134 (1907) ; Pyle v. Henderson, 65 W. Va. 39, 63 S. 
E. 762 (1909); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 
(1909); American Window Glass Co. v. Williams 30 Ind. App. 685, 66 N. E. 
912 (1903),; Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. Grainger, 33 Ind. App. 559, 70 N. E. 
395 (1904); Consumers' Gas Co. v. Worth, 163 Ind. 141, 71 N. E. 489 (1904); 
Consumers' Gas Co. v. Ink, 163 Ind. 174· 71 N. _E. 477 (1904); LaFayette 
Gas Co. v. Kelsay, 164 Ind. 563, 74 N. E: 7 (1905); Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. 
Beales, 166 Ind. 684, 76 N. E. 520 (1go6); Campbell v. Rocle Oil Co., 15::: 
Fed. 191 (1907). . 
,. Consumers' Gas Co. v. Crystal Wirn;Iow Glass Co., ~63 Ind. 190, 7:> N. 
E. 366 (1904) ; Consumers' Gas Co. v. Howard, 163 Ind. 170, 71 N. E. 493 
(1904); Logansport Gas Co. v. Seegar, 165 Ind. 1, 74 N. E. 500 (1905); 
New American Oil Co. v. Wolff, 166 Ind. 704 76 N. E. 255 (1906); Puritan 
Oil Co. v. Myers, 39 Ind. App. 6g5, 80 N. E. 851 (1907); Consumers' Gas 
Co. v. Ink, 168 Ind. 174 71 N. E. 477 (1904); Consumers' Gas Co. v. Worth, 
163 Ind. 141, 71 N. E. 489 (1904); LaFayette Gas Co. ·v. Kelsay, 164 Ind.· 
563, 74 N. E. 7 (1905) ;·Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. Beales, 166 Ind. 684, 76 N. 
E. 520 (1go6); American Window Glass Co. v. Indiana Nat .. Gas. Co.,, 37 
Ind. App. 439, 76 N. E. 10o6 (1906) ; Campbell v. Rock Oil Co., 151 Fed. 
191 (1907); Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 329, 88 S. E. 1075 (1916); 
Johnson v. Armstrong, 81 W. Va. 399, 94 S. E. 753 (1918). 
· These cases were decided on the theory "that where the lessee has the 
right to hold the lease indefinitely by the pa:rment of a rental, the courts 
will imply a condition for the development of the lease, this to be put into 
operation upon the lessor's demand foi: a well.. within a reasonable time, 
and failure on part of th~ lessee to comply. 
In Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (1896), the haben-
dum clause read: "To have and to hold the said -premises for said pur-
poses during and until the full term of two years next ensuing, and as much 
longer as oil or gas is found in paying quantities, or the rental paid therevn." 
THE l,AW OP OIL AND GAS 171 
to provide that the lease should terminate at the end of a definite 
term of. reasonable duration unless production were found mean-
while. 
Having traced the evolution of the habendum clause to its 
present form, a critical examination of the modern clause becomes 
necessary. .i\t the beginning there was no uniformity in the phrase-
ology of the provision.16 Now, however, the habendum clause 
In order to strike down the right of the lessee to hold the lease beyond the 
two-year term by the paymt>nt of rental, the court construed the word "or'' as 
"and," stating that the word "rental" as here used meant the royalty provided 
for in the lease in the event of production and that the term did not refer to 
the commutation money payalile during the exploratory period. 
To the same effect: Western Pa. Gas Co. v. George, l6I Pa. St. 47, 28 
Atl. 1004 (1894); American Window Glass Co. v. Indiana Nat. Gas Co., 
supra. 
1
• "To have and to hold the same unto the lessee for the term of two 
years from date and as long thereafter as oil or gas is found in paying 
quantities, not exceeding in the whole the term of twenty-five years.'' Brown 
v. Fowler, 65 Ohio St. 507, 63 N. E. 76 (1902). 
"To have and to hold the said premises * * * for, during and until the 
full term of fifteen years next ensuing, with the right of renewal thereafter 
so long as oil shall continue to be found in sufficient quantities to operate." 
Heintz v. Shortt, 149 Pa. St. 286, 24 Atl. 316 (1892). 
"Three years and as long thereafter as oil or gas shall continue to be 
found in paying quantities." McMillan v. Philadelphia Co., 159 Pa. St. 142, 
28 Atl. 220 (1893). 
"To have and to hold said premises for and during the term of one 
year from this date * * * It is further agreed th~t should a paying produc-
tion of oil or gas be found on said land within said term of one year, the 
lessor agrees to extend this lease from year to year so long as said produc-
tion continues." Crawford v. Bellevue Gas Co., 183 Pa. St. 22'/, 38 Atl. 595 
(1897). 
"Ninety days from d;ite and as much longer as oil or gas is found, 
operated and produced in paying quantities." Dettor v. Holland, 57 Ohio 
St. 492, 49 N. E. 69o (1898). 
"Contract to commence at and run from date of signing, and terminate 
whenever, in the assumption of the lessee, sufficient oil or gas cannot be 
produced to use the same profitably for mercantile purposes." American 
Steel Co. v. Tate, 33 Ind. App. 504, 71 N. E. 189 (1904). 
''Two years, or for such time as oil or gas shall be found in paying 
quantities." Iams v. Carnegie Nat. Gas Co., 194 Pa. St. 72, 45 Atl 54 (1899). 
"This conitract shall be deemed to commence from date of signing, and 
shall be deemed to have terminated whenever natural gas ceases to be used 
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usually assumes the form originally set forth in this paper, the 
only variation being that in some leases the grant will be for a 
definite term of years and as long thereafter as oil or gas is found 
in paying quantities, while in others the lease will be for a definite 
term of years and as long thereafter as oil or gas shall be produced 
in paying quantities.17 The courts attribute the same legal effect 
to these two phrases. For simplicity of stateriient the original or 
definite term of the modern lease will .be designated here as the 
"exploratory period." Obviously the length of this period wiil de-
pend upon :the peculiar condition of the property at the time the 
lease is made. If the land is in the neighborhood of production or 
if other circumstances indicate that the tract is oil-bearing, it is the 
natural disposition of the lessor to restrict the duration of the ex-
ploratory period. Accordingly we find that in the developed fields 
the duration of the fixed term ranges from sixty days in extreme 
cases to two years.18 This means, of course, that a lease of this 
character terminates within the short term set forth therein uniess 
generally for manufacturing purposes." Indianapolis Gas Co. v. Kibbey, 
135 Ind. 357, 35 N. E. 392 (1893). 
"Five years from date of lease and as much longer thereafter as oil or 
gas is found therein or said premises developed or operated." Doornbos v. 
Warwick, 104 Kan. 102, 177 Pac. s2i (1919). 
"Five years from date of lease and as much longer as the rent for fail-
ure to commence operations is paid, and as long after the commencement 
of operations as said premises are operated for the production of oil and 
gas." :Myers v. Carnahan, 61 W. Va. 414, 57 S. E. 134 (1907). 
'
1Five years from date of lease or as long as oil or gas shall be found 
in paying quantities or the said second party or its assigns continue to 
operate a pipeline over or through the land." Simon v. Northwestern Ohio 
Gas Co., 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 170 (18g6). 
11 Jamisoru v. Carnegie Nat. Gas. Co., 77 W. Va. 30, 87 S. E. 451 (1915); 
Core v. New York Pet. Co., 52 \V. Va. 276, 43 S. E. 128 (1903); Balfour v. 
Russell, 167 Pa. St. 287, 31 Ail. 570 ( 1895) ; Hooks v. Forst, 165 Pa. 238, 30 
Atl. 846 (1895); Smiley v. Gallagher, 164 Pa. St. 493, 30 Atl. 713 (1894); 
Gibson v. Oliver, 158 Pa. 277, 27 Atl. g61 (1893); Marshall v. Forest Oil Co., 
198. Pa. 83, 47 Atl. 927 (1901); Dinsmoor v. Combs, 177 Ky. 740, 198 S. W. 
58 (1917) ; Jamison Coal Co. v. Carnegie Gas Co., 77 W. Va. 30, 87 S. E. 
451 (1915). 
In the following cases '1:he leases involved were effective for a period 
of sixty days from date and as long thereafter as oil or gas shoulci he pro·· 
duced: 
18 Simon v. Northwestern Gas Co., 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 170 (1896); 
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the property is made productive within t11at time. On the other 
hand, where wildcat territory is involved, the lessee wili not agree 
to a short exploratory period. In such circumstances it is usual 
to provide for a lease effective 'for a term of five or ten years and 
as long thereafter as oil or gas shall be found, the lessee having 
the right to !Ilaintain the lease for the original term by the pay-
ment of a periodical rental, and the alternative right to surrender 
the instrument when the prospective value of the lands covered 
thereby no longer justifies the payment of the prescribed rental. 
With these basic considerations in mind we are brought to the 
task of determining the legal effect of this provision in its several 
phases. First of all it must be understood that we are not dealing 
with the abandonment, forfeiture, or surrender of an oil and gas 
lease at some period within the life of th~ instrument. All these 
matters will be treated elsewhere. The sole question which con-
cerns us here is the divestiture of the lessee's title by the e.~piration 
of the term provided for in the lease. Before approaching the 
broader aspects of the subject certain incidental questions should 
be disposed of. Usually the extension clause assumes one of these 
Duffield v. Russell, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 266 (1899); Murdock-West Co. v. 
Logan, 6g Ohio St. 514. 69 N. E. g84 (1904). 
Ninety days and as long thereafter: Evans v. Consumers' Gas Co., -
Ind.-, 29 N. E. 3g8 (18g1); Dettor v. Holland, 57 Ohio St. 492, 49 N. E. 
6go (18g8). . 
Six months and as long thereafter: Consumers· Gas Co. v. Worth, 163 
Ind. 141, 71 N. E. 489 (1904); Consumers' Gas Co. v. Ink, 168 Ind. 174. 71 
N. E. 477 (1904). 
One year and as long thereafter: Crawford v. Bellevue Gas Co., 183 
Pa. St. 227, 38 Atl. 595 (18g7); Noble v. Western Pa. Gas Co., 255 Pa. 512, 
100 Atl. 48o (1917); Updegraff v. Blue Creek Coal Co., 74 W. Va. 316, 81 
S. E. 1050 (1914); Horse Cn:ek Coal Co. v. Trees, 75 W. Va. 559, 84 S.'E. 
376 (1915); Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., &i W. Va. 187, 94 S. E. 47.2 
(1917); Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Greenleaf, - W. Va.-, 99 S. E. 274 (1919); 
Harrington v. Wood, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 326 (1892); Chaney v. Ohio Oil 
Co., 32 Ind. App. 193, 6g N. E. 477 (1904). 
Two years and as long thereafter: Midland Gas Co. v. Jefferson County 
Gas Co., 237 Pa. 602, 85 Atl. 853 (1912); Gillespie v. American Zinc Co., 
247 Pa. 222, 93 Atl. 272 (1915); Harness v. Eastern Oil Co., 49 W. Va. 232, 
38 S. E. 662 (1901); Core v. New York Pet Co., 52 W. Va. 27, 43 S. E. 12!! 
(1903); Petty v. United Fuel Co., 76 W. Va. 268, 85 S. E . .523 (1915); Law-
son v. Kirchner, 50 W. Va. 344, 40 S. E. 344 (1901). 
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forms: "As long thereafter.as oil or gas is found in paying quanti-
ties,'' "as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quanti-
ties," "as long thereafter as oil or gas is prod·uced-." The rule is 
settled that the two clauses first mentioned are identical in their 
legal effect.10 On the other hand the early decisions in West Vir-
ginia inti~te a distinction between the first two clauses and the 
last, which omits the phrase "paying quantities."~0 Later, however, 
the West Virginia court said: "'Produced', 'produced in paying 
quantities', 'found in paying quantities' must mean about the same 
thing, else substance will be subordinated to shadow or mere tech-
nicality."21 It is held that the "thereafter" clause determines the 
character of the estate created by an oil and gas lease.2 !) On prin-
ciple, however, the clause simply enlarges or extends an estate al-
ready created. This concl~sion is also supported by authority.23 In 
New York the court declares that the words "as long thereafter as 
oil or gas shall be found" are words of limitation.u The validity 
of the clause under consideration is seldom challenged. In a Kan-
sas case the contention was made that the "thereafter" clause ren-
"'South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 961 (1912); 
Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 6g Ohio St. 514, 6g N. E. 984 (1904); Young 
v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. St. 243, 45 Atl. 12I (1899). 
•Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909); 
McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909). Contra: 
Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 26o Ill. 16g, 102 N. E. 1043 (1913). 
11 South Penn Oil. Co. v. Snodgrass, supra. For an interesting discussion 
of the meaning of the term "found" as here used, see Smith v. Hickman, 14 
Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 46 (1900). 
"'Rynd v. Rynd Farm Oil Co., 63 Pa. St. 397 (186g). Here a similar 
provision was involved and the lessee was producing oil in paying quantities. 
It was held that the clause created a perpetual license. In Bruner v. Hicks, 
230 Ill. 556, 82 N. E. 888 (1907), jt was held that the use of the clause "as 
tong thereafter as oil or gas shall be found" had the effect of vesting the 
lessee with a freehold interest because of . the indefinite and indeterminate 
period provided for in the grant. 
•South Penn Oil. Co. v. Snodgrass, supra; Barbot{r, Stedman Co. v. 
Tompkins, 81 W. Va. u6, 93 S. ·E. 1038 (1917); Chaney v. Ohio & Indiana 
Oil Co., 32 Ind. App. 193, 6g N. E. 477 (1904); Johnson v. Armstrong, 81 
W. Va. 399. 94 S. E. 753 (1918); Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa. St. 359, 44 AtL 
446 (1899). . 
"'Eaton v. Alleghany Gas Co., 122 N. Y. 416, 25 N. E. g81 (189c>); Conk-
ling v. Krandusky, II2 N. Y. Supp. 13 (1908). 
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dereci the lease void on the grotl1'd of uncertainty. The court, in 
overruling this objection, said: "We have not been referred to any 
adjudicated cases involving the validity of gas or oil contracts like 
the one at bar where leases containing such stipulations have been 
held void for uncertainty.25 The only other case where the validey. 
of the oil and gas lease has been assailed on account of the duration 
of the term is where it is contended that the lease violates the rule 
against perpetuities. On principle this assault is justifiable only 
in those jurisdictions which hold that no estate vests until discov-
ery, or that a new and additional estate vests upon cEscovery. 
Moreover, the doctrine if sustainable there would be limited to the 
so-called "no term" lease which the lessee has the right to maintain 
indefinitely by the payment of a rental, or to a lease of fixed term 
extending beyond the period of twenty-one years. In this respect 
the phrase "as long thereafter as oil or gas shall ·be found in paying 
quantities" is not involved. Even in the case of a "no term" lease 
it is held that the instrumt:nt does not violate the rule against per-
petuities because the lessor may refuse the rental, demand a well, 
and forfeit the lease if the well is not drilled within a reasonable 
time.211 No American. court has held that an oil and gas lease is 
invalid merely for the reason that it is effective for a definite term 
and as long thereafter as oil or gas shall be found. 
Dismissing these preliminary matters, the principal question 
involved in the present inquiry may be thus stated. When and 
under what conditions does a lease of this character terminate? 
As a practical matter the modern habendum clause is important in. 
the following circumstances: First, where the lessee fails to de-
velop the property in any manner during the exploratory period; 
second, when the well or wells drilled by him during that time are 
'"Dickey v. Coffeyville Brick Co., 6g Kan. 1o6, 76 Pac. 3g8 (1904). But 
see United Fuel Supply Co. v. Volcanic Oil & Gas Co., 20 Ont. Weekly Rep. 
78, where a tease of this type was involved, and where the court, denomi-
nating the instrument an option, held that it was invalid on the ground of 
remoteness. 
"Wilson v. Reserve Gas. Co., 78 W. Va. 329. 88 S. E. 1075 (1916); John-
son v. Armstrong, 81 W. Va. 399, 94 S. E. 753 (1918). For an interesting 
discussion of this question by Professor James W. Simonson, of the West 
Virginia University, see 25 WF.sT VIRGINIA LAW QuARTF.RLY, p. 30; also note 
relating to the same subject, 25 WF.sT VIRGINIA LAW QUARTF.RJ.Y, p. 236. 
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non-productive; third, when the well or wells drilled during the 
exploratory period cease to produce before the end of the definite 
term. Ignoring the possjbility of the forfeiture, abandonment, or 
surrender of the grant within the definite term, the question upon 
principle is susceptible of but one· answer. The plain intent of the 
clause is that the lease shall terminate absolutely upon the happen-
ing of any one of the three contingencies just mentioned. Su~h, 
precisely, is the universal holding of the courts.27 It is equally 
zr Conkling v. Krandusky, II2 N Y. Supp. 13; Eaton v. Alleghany Gas 
Co., 122 N. Y. 416, 25 N. E. g81 (1890); Shellar v. Shivers, 171 Pa. St. 56g, 
33 Atl. 95 (1895); Riddle v. Mellon, 147 Pa. St. 30, 23 Atl. 241 (18g2); 
Western Pa. Gas Co. v. George, 161 Pa. St. 47, 28 Atl. 1004 (1894); Cassell 
v. Crothers, 193 Pa. St. 359, 44 Atl. 4.¢ (1899); Glasgow v. Chartiers Oil 
Co., 152 Pa. St. 48, 25 Atl. 232 (1892); Double v. Union Light & Heat Co., 
172 Pa. St. 388, 33 Atl. 694 (18g6); Young v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. St. 
243, 45 Atl. 121 (1899); Smith v. Hickman, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 46 (1900); 
Balfour v. Russell, 167 Pa. St. 287, 31 Atl. 570 (1895) ; Summerville v. 
Apollo Gas Co., 207 Pa. 334, 56 Atl. 876 (1904); Foster v. Elk Fork Oil Co., 
90 Fed. 178 (18g8); ~arnsdall v. Boley, II9 Fed. 191 (1902); Bettman v. 
Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 2jl (18g6); McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 
65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. 
Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909); Barbour, Stedman Co. v. Tompkins, 81 W. 
Va. n6, 93 S. E. 1038 (1917); Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Gr~enleaf, - W. Va. 
-, 99 S. E. 274 (1919); Ash Grove Lime Co. v. Chanute Brick Co., 100 
Kari. 547, 164 Pac. lo87 (1917); Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co., - Kan. -; 
"189 Pac. 920 (1920); Buffalo Valley Oil Co. v. Jones, 75 Kan. 18, 88 Pac. 
537 (1907); Collins v. Mt. Pleasant Oil Co., 85 Kan. 483, n8 Pac. 54 (19n); 
Roach v. Junction Oil Co., 75 Okla. 220, 179 Pac. 934 (1919); Strange v. 
Hicks, II Okla. App. 369, 188 Pac. 347 (1920); Dickey v. Coffeyville Brick 
Co., 6g Kan. 106, 76 Pac. "3g8 (1904) ; Simon v. Northwestern Ohio Gas Co., 
12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 170 (18g6) ; B.rown v. Fowler, 65 Ohio St . .r;07, 63 N. 
E. 76 (1902); Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 6g Ohio St. 514 69 N. E. 98-t 
(1904)·; Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio St. 492, ·49 N. E. 690 (18g8); North-
w.estem Oh,io Nat. Gas Co. v. Whitacre, 30 C. C. Rep. 737 (1892); North-
western Ohio Gas Co. v. Tiffin, 59 Ohio St. 420, 54 N. E. 77 (1899); Poe a:. 
Ulrey, 233 Il1. 56, 84 N. E. 46 (1go8) ; Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., z6o lll. 169, 
102 N. E. 1043 (1913); Chaney v. Ohio Oil Co., 32 Ind. App. 193, 69 N. E. 
4'17 (1904); Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. Beales, 166 Ind. 684, 74 N. E. 551 
(1905); American Window Glass Co. v. Indiana Nat. Gas Co., 37 Ind. App. 
439, 76 N. E. IOo6 (1906); Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. Pierce, 34 Ind. App. 523, 
68 N. E. 6g1 (1903), 73 N E. 194 (1905); Nabors v. Producers' Oil Co., 140 
La. 985, 74 So. 527 (1917); Prowant v. Sealy, II Okla. App. 10, 187 Pac. 
235 (1920); Zeller v. Book, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N.S.) 429 (1905); Hot-
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clear ·both upon principle and under the authorities just cited, that 
if the lessee is producing oil or gas in paying quantities at the ex-
piration of the definite term, the lease shall remain in force as long 
as that condition continues. Thus, in Brown v. Fowler28 it is said: 
"This clause means that the term of the lease is limited to two 
years (the definite or exploratory term), but that if within the 
two years oil or gas shall be found, then the lease shall run as much 
longer thereafter as oil or gas shall be found in paying quantities; 
but if no oil or gas shall be found within the two years, the lease 
shall, at the end of the two years, terminate, not by forfeiture, but 
by expiration of terms; and after the expiration of said two years 
no further drilling can be done under the lease." In an Indiana 
case it is said: "Such a clause will be construed as meaning that if 
the term is enlarged it must be ·by the production of gas or oil in pay-
ing quantities within the term specified; if such a contingency does 
not happen then the lease expires and is of no avail to either 
party."29 In Murdock-West Co. v. Logan29a the court observes: 
"In order to continue their lease beyond the stipulated time it was 
necessary for the lessees to find oil in paying quantities. For this 
purpose it was not sufficient to complete a well having some indica-
tions of oil or a well which might be developed into a well pro-
ducing oil in paying quantities, but the lessees must actually find 
oil in paying quantities, and this is the same as obtaining and pro-
ducing it in paying quantities." 
Thus far the decisions are in complete harmony, but there are 
other situations of almost equal importance which evidence a cer-
tain divergence in the adjudicated cases. The general rule is this. 
Where the fixed term has expired and where the lessee seeks to 
hold the leased premises under the extension clause he not only 
must be engaged in producing oil or gas but the production must be 
in paying quantities.30 This necessitates that we ascertain the exact 
meaning of the phrase "paying quantities" as employed here. In 
lister v. Vandergrift, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N.S.) 586 (1892); Hazel Green 
Oil Co. v. Collier, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 495, no S. W. "343 (1go8); American 
Window Glass Co. v. Williams, 30 Ind. App. 685, 66 N. E. 912 (1903). 
"Brown v. Fowler, supra . 
.. Chaney v. Ohio & Indiana Oil Co., s11pra. 
"'a Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, supra. 
:i> See cases cited under note 27. 
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the law of oil and gas the term has two distinct meanings. It fre-
quently happens that a lessee will agree to proceed with the drilling 
of the property as long as the wells encountered produce oil in pay-
ing quantities. Then again there is always an implied condition or 
covenant in the lease which requires the lessee to offset paying wells 
on adjoining lands. In either case the rule is settled that the well 
must be of such capacity as to reasonably insure a profit over the 
-original cost of drilling and equipping the well, and also a profit over 
the expense of operation. In other words, two factors are taken into 
consideration: first, the initial cost of the well, and secondly, the 
cost of operation.31 On the other hand where the term appears in 
the habendum clause or in any other provision establishing the dura-
tion of the lease, the initial cost of the well is disregarded and the 
lessee has the right to hold the lease as long as the well or wells pay 
a profit, however small, over the cost of operation.32 In Young v. 
01 Osborn v. Finkelstein, -· Ind. -, 126 N. E. II (1920) ; Ohio Fuel Sup-
ply Co. v. Shilling, - Ohio-, 127 N. E. 873 (1920); Hart v. Standard Oil 
Co., - La.-, 84 So. 169 (1920); Aycock v. Paraffine Oil Co., - Tex.-. 
210 S. W. 851 (1919); Ardizzone v. Archer, - Okla. -, 178 Pac. 263 
(191;}); Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, - Okla.-, 188 Pac. lo69 (I<)20); 
Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, - Okla.-, l7i Pac. 104 (1918); Manhattan Oil 
Co. v. Carrell, 164 Ind. 526, 73 N. E. lo84 (1905). 
In Montgomery v. Hickok, 188 111. App. 348 (1914), however, it is held 
that where a sum of money was payable upon the completion of a paying 
well, the cost of drilling and equipping the well is not to be taken into con-
sideration. 
But where the parties define the term "paying quantities" as meaning a 
well of a designated capacity, this definition must control. McLean v. Kishi 
(Tex. Civ. App.), 17;:1 S. \V. 502 (1915). 
~Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa. St. 359, 44 Atl. 446 (1899); Young Y. 
Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. St. 243, 45 Atl 121 (1899); South Penn Oil Co. v.' 
Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 961 (1912); Barbour, Steelman Co. v. 
Tompkins, 81 W. Va. n6, 93 S. E. 1038 (1917); McGraw Oil Co. v. Ken· 
nedy. 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 
W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909) ; Jennings v. Carbon Co., 73 W. Va. 215, 
8o S. E. 368 (1913); Dickey v. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick Co., 69 Kan. 100, 
76 Pac. 398 (1904); Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, supra; Barnsdall v. 
Boley, II9 Fed. 191 (1902); Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 53 
W. Va. 501, 44 S. E. 433 (1903); Hollister v. Vandergrift, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. 
Rep. (N. S.) 586 (1892); Zeller v. Book, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N.S.) 429 
(1CJ05); Herrington v. Wood, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 326 (1892). In deter-
mining whether a well is producing oil or gas in paying quantities in 
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Forest Oil Company the court said: "But if the well, being down, 
pays a profit, even a small one, over the operating expenses, it is 
producing in paying quantities, although it may never repay its 
cost, and the operations as a whole may result in a loss. Few wells 
except the very largest repay their cost under a considerable time. 
Many never do, but that is no reason why the first loss should not 
be reduced by profits, however small, in continuing to operate." 
This quotation furnishes the test to determine when a lease of this 
character expires. If the production is sufficient to yield a profit, 
however small, over the daily operating expenses, the lease remains 
in force. On the other hand the lease terminates when this condition 
no longer obtains. While this is clearly the general rule when the 
"thereafter" clause includes the phrase "in paying quantities," 
there is a conflict on the question where these words are omitted. 
As heretofore stated, the courts of Pennsylvania, West Virginia 
and Ohio apparently hold that there is no difference in the legal 
effect of a clause containing the phrase "produced in paying quan-
tities" and one limited to the use of the word "produced." The 
Supreme Court of Illinois, however, draws a distinction between 
the two provisions.ss Here the lease involved was for five years 
and "so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced thereon." A pro-
ducing well was drilled within the definite term, but it was not 
a paying well in the sense already indicated. The court said: "Oil 
was produced continuously after the drilling of the well. It is true 
that the quantity produced was so small as to make the venture un-
the sense here used, the judgment of the lessee, if exercised in good 
faith, is given great, if not controlling, weight. Barbour v. Tompkins, 
supra; McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, supra; Bay State Pet. Co. v. South 
Penn Lubricating Co., 121 Ky. 637, 87 S. W. II02 ( 1905) ; Summerville v. 
Apollo Gas Co., 207 Pa. 334, 56 Atl. 876 (1904); Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-
Sibley Co., supra; Urpman v. Lowther Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S. E. 433 
(1903); Zeller v. Book, supra; Young v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. St. 243, 45 
Atl. 121 (1899) . 
.. Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 26o Ill. 16g, ·102 N. E. 1043 (1913). In South 
Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass,· 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. ¢1 (1912), the "there-
after" clause was restricted to the word "produced.!' fo critici~ing the hold-
ing of the Court of Appeals of West Virginia in this case, Professor Simon-
ton observes that this decision should have been founded upon the principle 
announced in the Gillespie case. "Extension of Term of Oil Lease through 
Discovery of Oil in less than 'Paying Quantities.'" \VJ;ST V1~GINIA I.Aw 
QuARWU.Y, Vol. 25, p. 79. 
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profitable, but the strict letter of the lease was complied with, and 
it had not expired by its own terms." Under this holding a lease of 
this class remains in force as long as a well produces oil, even 
though the oil is being produced at a loss to the lessee. This 
conclusion is sound upon principle. If the lessor intends that the 
lease shall terminate when it ceases to produce oil in paying quan-
tities, such intention should be manifested by a positive stipulation 
to that effect. 
But the notable exception to the prevailing rule that a lease of 
this type terminates at the end of the exploratory period unless at 
·that time the lessee is producing oil in paying quantities is found 
in West Virginia. In Soztth Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass,34. the lease 
was fo~ a term of ten years and as long thereafter as oil or gas 
should be produced, the phrase "paying quantities" being omitted. 
In other words the lease was of the same character as the one con-
sidered by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the Gillespie case. 
Shortly before the expiration of the definite term the lessee drilled 
an oil well, but the well was not producing in paying quantities at 
the expiration of the stated term, or at any time thereafter. The 
lessee, however, continued to pump the well at intervals, and there 
was no evidence of an intention on his part to abandon the well. 
The fixed term expired December 14, 1909. In the meanwhile a 
paying well came in on adjacent lands, and on the 18th day of De-
cember, 1909, which was after the expiration of the specified term, 
the lessee made location for a second well on the leased premises, 
this being an offset to the paying well on the adjoining tract. The 
statement of the case implies that it was the bona fide intention of 
the lessee to proceed with the drilling of the second well. The day 
the location for this well was made, however, the lessor executed a 
second lease to third parties on the theory that the prior lease had 
terminated through the failure of the lessee to produce oil or gas in 
paying quantities at the expiration of the exploratory period. The 
lessor and the junior lessee sought to oust the senior lessee, who 
thereupon brought this action in equity to cancel the second lease as 
a cloud on his title, and to restrain the lessor and the subsequent 
lessee from interfering with his possession under the former lease. 
The court stated the question in this wise: "Whether the mere dis-
covery of oil within the term created by the lease (a) without pro-
"' South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, S11pra. 
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duction thereof, or (b) in quantity too slight for profitable produc-
tion suffices to extend the term beyond the period of ten years un-
der the phrase "as long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them 
is produced therefrom by the party of the second part." Mani-
festly, this question was susceptible of an affirmative answer upon 
the principle if:hat the extension clause was dependent upon the 
mere production of oil, and not upon the production of oil in pay-
ing quantities. But the court expressly rejected this view of the 
case, and founded its decision upon broader ground. After con-
sidering the reasoning of certain decisions which hold that a lease of 
this type terminates absolutely at the expiration of the specific 
term unless the lessee is producing oil or gas in paying quantities,85 
the court declared that these cases accorded too much force and ef-
fect to the letter of the habendum clause, and did violence to the 
spirit of ithe entire contract. The court continued: "The main 
purpose of the lessor is to obtain diligent and skillful effort to make 
his mines yield him a profit after the fixed term as well as within it. 
If the lessee, having discovered minerals within the term or con-
temporaneously with it:he expiration thereof, continues operations 
with diligence, he thereby obviously executes the chief purpose of 
.the lease, and would be clearly within his rights if within the term. 
To regard it as compliance within the prescribed condition after 
the fixed term would be entirely consistent with the idea of exten-
sion or continuation of the tenancy, which is undoubtedly the major 
office or function of the clause. May we not, therefore, say the 
qualifying clause 'as oil or gas is produced' really means 'as long as 
the premises are diligently and efficiently operated, provided the 
minerals shall have been discovered within the fi:>:ed term!, which 
construction harmonizes the more completely and naturally with 
the manifest purpose of the parties as indicated by the other pro-
visions of the lease, their situation, and the surrounding circum.-
stances." Viewing the question in this light, the court then held 
that if the lessee discovers oil within the fixed term and if at the 
end of such term he is continuing his search diligently, the lease re-
mains in force as long as he perseveres in his effort to find oil or 
gas. When this decision is given practical application it would sus-
""Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa. St. 359, 44 Atl. 446 (1899); Murdock-
West Co. v. Logan, 69 Ohio St. 514, 69 N. E. 984 (1904); Barnsdall v. Boley, 
II9 Fed. 191 (1902). 
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tain a lease in either of the following situations: First, where the 
lessee, at the expiration of the definite term, is making no effort to 
produce oil from the discovery well but is diligently engaged in the 
drilling of another well or in operations leading to that result; sec-
ondly, where the lessee, at the expiration of the definite term, is 
producing oil, from the discovery well but not in paying quantities, 
and where, at the same time, he is engaged in further operations of 
the character just alluded to. This decision is contrary to the over-
whelming weight of authority upon the question. Moreover, it is , 
utterly unsound in principle. In a brief dissenting opinion Judge 
Robinson said: "This decision makes the contract between the par-
ties to be other than that which they must have contemplated when 
the lease was executed." This observation strikes at the heart of 
the majority opinion. The fundamental error evident here lies in 
the fact that the court confused the function of the drilling clat~se 
wit!l. the office of the habendum clause. The sole office of the ha-
bendum clause is to fix the duration of the lease. On the other 
hand, different provisions determine the measure of diligence to be 
exercised by the lessee in the development of the property. As a 
rule the obligation to drill during the specific term is set forth ex-
pressly. Where this is not the case, it arises by legal implication. 
After the.,expiration of the fixed term and where the lease is held 
by production under the "thereafter" clause, the obligation for 
further drilling is usually implied. In either event the right to drill 
is restricted to the term of the lease as established by the habendum 
clause. Where a lease is for a definite term of years and as long 
thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities, the plain 
intent of the contract is that the lease shall terminate at the end of 
the definite term unless oil is being produced in the prescribed quan-
tity. Where the lease is for a definite term of years and as long 
thereafter as oil or gas is produced, it is equally clear. that the lease 
sha11 terminate at the end of the definite term unless oil or gas is 
being produced in some quantity. In the latter situation the lessee 
would not be permitted to hold the lease indefinitely by the opera-
tion of a nonpaying well, as the law would imply an obligation re-
quiring the lessee to conduct further operations. In brief, it is just 
as reasonable to say that a lease of fixed duration without the 
"thereafter" clause will remain in force after the expiration of the 
stipulated term if drilling operations are then in progress, as it is 
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to say that $UCh operations would extend a lease of the character 
under discussion here. Such, precisely, is the view of Professor 
Simonton, of the University of West Virginia, in his criticism 
of this decision.36 Notwithstanding the obvious posture of this 
question upon principle and authority, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia, in a later decision, adheres to the doctrine 
of the Snodgrass case.31 · 
Remembering that the lessee in the Snodgrass case was making 
some effort to produce oil at the expiration of the definite term and 
several days thereafter made a location for a second well which he 
intended to drill until his possession was thre.atened by the lessor 
and the junior lessee, this expression from the opinion is pertinent: 
"Is the situation here such as may occur under any oil and gas 
lease, drawn as this one was? If so, both parties must have intend-
ed an equitable and just result under the circumstances, if the terms 
used will permit it, for they must be deemed to have foreseen and 
contemplated it. It is matter of common knowledge that no man 
can estimate the exact time within which a well can be completed, 
and that delays due to accidents, trivial and grave, and other causes 
beyond the possibility of accurate anticipation, will occur. Ad-
herence to the strict letter of the extension clause would make no 
allowance for any of these, and inflict disastrous losses upon dili-
gent and honest lessees in many instances,-a consequence plainly 
not within the intent of either party." This deduction is wholly un-
warranted. A lease of this type by express and positive provision 
contemplates the enlargement of the specific term upon one of two 
clearly defined conditions: First, the actual production of oil in 
paying quantities at the expiration of the exploratory period, or, 
secondly, the actual production of oil or gas in some quantity at 
that time. Only by doing violence to the explicit provisions of the 
contyact can it be said that a mere discovery before the expiration 
of the limited term and drilling operations at the time of such ex-
piration shall have the effect of carrying the lease as long as oper-
ations are carried on. _It is true that the drilling of an oil well is at-
tended by such uncertainty that no one can anticipate the length of 
time which will ·be required to complete the undertaking. But the 
answer to the situation is readily apparent. The lessee must com-
.. W'SST VmGINIA LAW QuARTtRI.Y, Vol. 25, p. 79-
"'0hio Fuel Oil Co. v. Greenleaf, -W. Va.-, 99 S. E. 274 (1919). 
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mence his well in ample time to enable him to complete· it within the 
definite term of the lease, or he must provide against the contin-
gency which the Court describes by an appropriate term in his con-
tract.88 The latter alternative is becoming an established custom 
in the business. In Oklahoma, Kansas, and Texas the following 
habendum clause is very generally employed: 
"To have and to hold all and singular the rights and privi-
leges granted hereunder to and unto the lessee, its succes-
sors and assigns, for the term of five years from date hereof 
(a) and as much longer thereafter as oil or gas shall be 
produced therefrom, (b) or royalties paid hereunder, ( c) or 
as much longer thereafter as the lessee in good faith shall 
conduct drilling operations thereon, and should production 
result from such operations this lease shall remain in force 
as long as oil or gas shall be produced." 
It is to be noticed that the first phrase is identical with the one ap-
pearing in the lease considered in the Snodgrass case, that is, the 
words "in paying quantities" are omitted. The second provision is 
designed to protect the lessee in this situation. Frequently a well 
producing gas will be found during the fixed term, and this will be 
the only production developed. Many times there will be no mar-
ket for the gas, which necessitates the shutting in of the well. As 
the ordinary lease contemplates actual production for the enlarge-
ment of the term, there might be some question about the lessee's 
right to hold the lease without producing the gas and yielding the 
lessor his royalty. Under this provision the lessee has the right to 
hold his lease after the fixed term by the payment of the gas royalty 
35 In Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co., - Kan. -, 189 Pac. 920 ( 1920), the 
lessee commenced a well in ample time to enable him to complete it before 
the expiration of the fixed term, but the completion of the well was inter-
fered with by weather conditions and a shortage of water. Holding that 
this was not a defense, and that the lessee should have protected himself 
against these contingencies by a proper provision in the lease, the court said: 
"The lessee * * * contracted positively that he would do certain work within 
a certain time, and that after that time his rights in the premises should 
cease unless oil or gas should be produced from 1he land. Neither was pro-
duced." Upon the basis of this holding the lease was cancelled. McLean v. 
Kishi (Tex. Ch-. App.), 173 S. W. 502 (1915). 
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st:.pulnted in the instrument, whether the gas is produced and mar-
keted or not. This precise question will be treated at greater length 
later. The third condition for extension meets the doctrine of the 
Snodgrass case squarely. There, upon the ground of legal impli-
cation, it was decided that development in process at the termina-
tion of the exploratory period would <hold the lease as long as op-
erations were continued. Here, by express stipulation, the lessee 
has that right. The validity of this third condition is upheld in a 
recent Oklahoma case.39 Here the habendum clause assumed this 
form: "To have and to hold the same for and during the term of 
three years from the date hereof, and as much longer thereafter as 
oil or gas is found therein, or said premises developed or operated." 
The lessee was not producing oil or gas at the end of the three-year 
term. Shortly before this period expired he commenced the drill-
ing of a well on the leased premises which was in process of com-
pletion at the time the definite term ended. The drilling of this .well 
was proceeded with until production in paying quantities was found. 
In the meanwhile, however, the lessor executed another lease to a 
third party on the theory that the prior lease had expired at the 
end of the three-year term. The senior lessee brought an action 
in equity to sustain his title. It was urged here that the phrase "or 
premises developed or operated" added nothing to the legal e:ff ect 
of the habendum clause, that this expression meant that the prem-
ises must be developed or operated within the three-year term 
alone, and that production was the only circumstance which would 
carry the lease beyond the definite term. It must be conceded .that 
these words are not free from ambiguity. At any rate the alter-
native right of extension lacked the clearness and precision of 
statement which characterizes the ·broader habendum clause first 
quoted. Notwithstanding this situation, the court found that the 
part!es must have had some definite purpose in view when they em-
ployed the phrase "premises developed or operated" in the dis-
junctive; that accordingly there were two conditions for the en-
largement of the term, first, actual pro"duction at the end of the 
three-year period, or secondly, development work in progress at 
that time. In as much as the lessee had complied with the second 
condition for the enlargement of the term, the title of the senior 
lessee was upheld. Other clauses of similar import appear in the 
80 Prowant v. Sealy, JI Okla. App. 10, 187 Pac. 235 (1920). 
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books.4° Finally, then, where a lessee intends to hold his lease be-
yond the definite term by drilling operations alone, an appropriate 
provision to that effect should be embodied in the lease. 
Having considered the major questions which are involved in our 
present inquiry, attention should be directed to certain matters of 
inddental concern. It some times happens that a producing well is 
completed on· or about the last day of the fixed term. Therefore it 
is important to ascertain the exact duration of the exploratory 
period. In determining this question it is held that the day the 
lease is dated must be excluded from the term. 41 Where a lease 
covers the oil deposits alone, the :finding of natural gas within the 
exploratory period will not extend the term.42 Upon the principle 
that the rights of the lessee are indivisible, and where the lease 
covers several different tracts of land, it is decided that the finding 
of oil or gas in paying quantities on any one of the tracts covered 
by the lease extends the term as to all tracts embraced within the 
lease.43 In Stahl v. VanVlecle4 .the lease was for five years and 
as long thereafter as oil. or gas should be produced in paying quan-
'°Doornbos v. Warwick, 104 Kan. 102, 177 Pac. 527 (1919): "Five years 
from date of lease and as much longer thereafter as oil or gas is found 
therein or said premises developed or operated." 
Myers v. Carnahan, 6r W. Va. 414 57 S. E. 134 (1!)07).: "Five years 
from date of lease and as much longer as the rent for failure to commence 
operations is .paid, and as long af tcr the commencement of operations as said 
premises are operated for the production of oil and gas.'" 
Simon v. Northwestern Ohio Gas Co., I2 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 170 (18g6): 
"Five years from date of lease or as long as oil or gas shall be found in 
paying quantities or the said second part31 or its assigns continue to operate 
a pipeline over•or through the land." 
41 Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909). 
42 Truby v. Palmer, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. Cas. 156, 6 Atl. 74 (1886); Allen 
v. Palmer, 136 Pa. St. 556, 20 A'f:l. 516 (18go). 
43 Pierce Oil Corporation v. Schacht, - Okla. -, 181 Pac. 731 (1919) ; 
Harness v. Eastern Oil Co., 49 W. Va. 232, 38 S. E. 662 (1901); Lynch v. 
Davis, 79 W. Va. 437, 92 S. E. 427 (1917); South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 
71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. g61 (1912); Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 
!?01 (1905); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, - Okla. -, 189 Pac. 540 (1920); 
Nabors v. Producers' Oil Co., 140 La. g85, 74 So. 527 (1917). 
"Stahl v. Van Vleck, 53 Ohio St. 136, 41 N. E. 35 (1895). 
In Turner v. Seep, 167 Fed. 646 (1909), the lessee had a period of sixty 
days from the termination of the lease within which to remove all material 
from the lease. The lease was cancelled, and in the decree the lessee was 
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tities. During. the fixed term the lessee commenced a well in ample 
time to complete it before the expiration of the term. The lessor, 
claiming a forfeiture, obtained an injunction restraining the lessee 
from furt~er operations. While the writ was in effect the fixed 
term of the lease expired. Upon appeal the writ was discharged, 
and the court held that the lessee, at the close of the litigation, was 
entitled to as much time to complete his well as still remained of 
his term when the injunction was issued. Where it is stated ·that a 
lease shall remain in force for the same length of time as a lease on 
adjoining premises, it is held that the term is made definite and 
certain by reference:'5 Even though the completion of a well with-
in the fixed term may be prevented by a shortage of water, weather 
conditions, or other unexpected happenings, the lease expires at 
the end of the exploratory period unless, contemporaneously there-
with, oil or gas is being produced in paying quantities.46 On the 
other hand, if the delay in the completion of the well within the 
fixed term is attributable to the conduct of the lessor, he may be 
estopped to assert that the lease has terminated.n Where a "no 
term" lease provided that it should remain in force as long as oil 
or gas was produced and where the lessee drilled a nonpaying well, 
it was held that he had a reasonable time from the completion of the 
well to resume the work of development.48 If a lessee before the 
expiration of the specific term finds gas in paying quantities in a 
shallow sand he may drill the well to a deeper sand; although the 
operation extends beyond the definite terms of the lease. Then if 
given sixty days to remove his property. See also Midland Oil Co. v. Turner, 
179 Fed. 74 (1910). • 
.. Butler v. City of Iola, 100 Kan. III, 163 Pac. 652 (1g17) • 
.. Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co., - Kan. -, 18g Pac. 921 (1920). 
The same principle is announced in Diehl v. Ohio Oil Co., 12 Ohio Cir. 
Ct. Rep. (N. S.) 539 (1892), although.here the lessee was given the right 
to complete the well, together with i:he use of an acre of ground for that 
purpose, and the court held that if production were found the less.ee should 
account for the royalty therefrom. This decision was based upon equitable 
considerations, and. is unsound in principle . 
.. Riddle v. Mellon, 147 Pa. St. 30, 23 Ai:l. 241 1892) ; Ohio Fuel Oil Co. 
v. Greenleaf, - W. Va.-, 99 S. E. 274 (1919); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coule-
han, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909); Strange v. Hicks, II Okla. App. 
369, 188 Pac. 347 (1920). Herrington v. Wood, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 326 
(1892) . 
.. Diehl v. Ohio Oil Co., 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. {N. S.) 539 (1892). 
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he find production in the deeper sand his lease remains in force as 
long as oil or gas is produced. If the well proves nonproductive 
in the deeper sand and the lessee then proceeds to utilize the gas 
from the shallow sand, the extension clause becomes effective.49 
· An important question which remains is this: If a lessee com-
pletes a well capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities 
and then refrains from operating the well, may he still hold his 
lease under the usual "thereafter" clause? The answer to this 
query depends upon whether the well produces oil or gas. An oil 
'vell differs from a gas well in the following particulars. Ordi-
narily there is a ready market for petroleum. On the other hand, 
the marketing of natural gas is attended with more or less uncer-
tainty. Unless a gas well is in the neighborhood of a city or town 
utilizing natural gas, or near a gas pipeline supplying more remote 
places, there is little or no opportunity to dispose of the gas pro-
duction. No one will undertake the expensive operation of install-
ing a gas pipeline until a large reserve supply of natural gas has 
been developed. Until these facilities are provided a gas well must 
remain idle.5<: Then, in the second place, the lessor's oil royalty 
consists of a share of the production which in itself implies the con-
tinued operation of the well in order that the lessor shall receive the 
benefits of his contract. In the case of gas wells, however, the 
usual royalty is an annual cash rental for each well. Therefore, 
should the lessee pay the stipulated rental and yet refrain from the 
operation of the well, the lessor is receiving the same compensa-
tion which he would receive if the gas were being produced. For 
these reasons the rule in this respect diverges. The principle is well 
established that a lessee seeking to hold his lease under the "there-
after" clause must operate the oil wells on his premises with reason-
able diligence.51 On the other hand, even where the "thereafter" 
clause provides that the lease shall remain in force as long as oil 
.. Eastem Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 53r, 64 S. E. 836 (1909); 
Roach v. Junction Oil & Gas Co., - Okla.-, 179 Pac. 934 (1919). 
"'Strange v. Hicks, II Okla. App. 36g, 188 Pac. 347 (1920). 
n Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 6!)0 0. S. 514 6g N. E. 984 (1904); Pro-
want v. Sealy, II Okla. App. IO, 187 Pac. 235 (1920); Collins v. Mt. Pleasant 
Oil & Gas Co., 85 Kan. 483, u8 Pac. 54 (19n). In this case it is said: 
"Now the cor..tract between the parties contemplates that the lessee shall 
not only explore and discover, but that if oil in paying quantities is dis-
covered, they shall operate and produce oil, so that the lessors can have 
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or gas shall be produced in paying quantities, which implies the ne-
cessity of continuous production, it is held 'that a lessee holding a 
lease under a gas well alone may refrain from the operation of the 
well upon the condition that he pays or tenders the stipulated gas 
royalties.62 
Tulsa, 0 klahoma. 
(To be continued) 
their share of the oil produced." In Zeller v. Book, 7 Ohio Cir. Ot. Rep. 
(N. S.) 429,(1905), where the operation of the property was stopped by 
causes beyond the control of the lessee, the court refused to hold that the 
lease had terminated. 
02 Summerville v. Apollo Gas Co., 207 Pa. 334, 56 Atl. 876 (I904); 
McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909). In 
Strange v. Hicks, II Okla. App. 36g, 188 Pac. 347 (1920), however, where 
the only provision for the payment of the gas royalty was conditioned upon 
the use of the gas, the court held that the case was open to oral proof as 
to whether the parties intended that the lease might be held by a gas well 
under the "thereafter" clause 'without the actual production of gas or the 
payment of the stipulated royalty. See also Herrington v. Wood, 6 Ohio 
Cir. Ct. Rep. 326 (1892). 
